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SUPREME COURT FOREWORD, 
OCTOBER TERM 2011: FEDERALISM POINTS 
AND THE SOMETIME RECOGNITION OF 
ESSENTIAL FEDERAL POWER 
Jonathan D. Varat* 
For some time now, a narrow but persistent majority of the Supreme 
Court has undertaken the project of circumscribing federal power. 
Marching under the banner of state sovereignty, this majority has 
attacked the flanks of congressional power in at least three areas: its 
enumerated powers, its power to direct the state administration of 
federal programs, and its power to abrogate state immunity from suit. 
During the October Term 2011, the battle over the appropriate balance 
of federal power and state sovereignty continued in earnest on all three 
fronts. This Foreword examines the Court’s 2011 term to find those 
points where contested federal power was upheld and reinforced and 
those where state sovereignty prevailed. These points tell us a great 
deal about the current state of affairs and the nature of the Court’s 
ongoing conflict, revealing that while some important federal 
strongholds held well, the state sovereignty forces rather clearly 
advanced further, though not always in lockstep either substantively or 
strategically. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
For some time now, particularly after the replacement of Justice 
Thurgood Marshall by Justice Clarence Thomas in 1991, a newly 
oriented, narrow, but persistent majority of the Supreme Court has 
undertaken the project of moving our constitutional landscape in the 
direction of circumscribing the power of Congress and enhancing 
state sovereignty. It has done so in a form of pincer movement, with 
the majority forces that march under the banner of state sovereignty 
attacking the flanks of federal power in at least three ways: (1) by 
limiting the scope of some of the most significant of the enumerated 
powers of Congress, (2) by enhancing the litigation immunity of the 
States under the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, and (3) by 
restricting the power of Congress to regulate the States qua States in 
the name of defending the core of state legislative and executive 
autonomy. It has advanced in fits and starts, sometimes pursuing 
evolutionary and sometimes more revolutionary campaigns, but its 
accumulated progress in the last two decades has been substantial. 
The significance of each advance, and all the advances taken 
together thus far, is a matter of opinion, but the overall direction is 
clear enough, and it is unlikely to change, much less reverse, without 
judicial reinforcements added to the ranks of the defenders of 
congressional prerogative. 
In launching and sustaining this assault, moreover, this 
slender—if changing—state sovereignty majority of five Justices has 
enforced its vision of the structural protections of federalism at least 
as energetically as the Court often has enforced the antimajoritarian, 
individual rights protections of the Constitution. In particular, it has 
acted without much regard for the protective role played by the 
political safeguards of federalism;
1
 it has relied instead on what fairly 
can be called the judicial safeguards of federalism, wielded 
essentially in the same fashion as the judicial safeguards of 
individual rights. Deference to Congress has been grudging, 
apparently because belief in the fundamental importance of state 
sovereignty is so strong, and because of the majority’s perception 
 
 1. The classic statement of this idea is found in Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards 
of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National 
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). The Court employed the idea in Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), in the process of rejecting a claim 
of state regulatory immunity from federal regulation. 
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that Congress too cavalierly has usurped power that does not belong 
to it, throwing out of balance the proper relationship between the 
dual sovereigns. 
Precedent sometimes has slowed the advance, but it hardly has 
been an impenetrable fortification. More potent for the defenders of 
federal power has been the Court’s likely unanimous belief that the 
objective has never been the unconditional surrender of all federal 
power, but the more limited objective of containment—of reigning in 
perceived congressional excesses without losing sight of the reality 
that national power is often needed to govern wide swaths of a 
globally, much less nationally, interdependent economy; that a 
unified nation must be maintained in the face of potentially 
dangerous centrifugal forces; that explicit enforcement authority for 
the protection of specified civil rights must be acknowledged, to 
some extent at least; and that the nation’s capacity for unified 
responses to geopolitical challenges must be preserved and 
supported. 
During the Court’s 2011 term, the battle over the appropriate 
balance of federal power and state sovereignty continued in earnest 
on all three fronts: the scope of Congress’s enumerated power, its 
power to abrogate state immunity from suit, and its power to direct 
state administration of federal programs. Taking stock of the decisive 
encounters, the pattern of the last two decades persisted. The state 
sovereignty forces rather clearly advanced further, though not always 
in lockstep either substantively or strategically. Yet some important 
federal strongholds held as well. In the end, there were notable 
affirmations and notable limitations of federal power—a mixed set of 
results that rather unmistakably still points toward future gains on 
behalf of state sovereignty at the expense of congressional power. 
The aim of this Foreword is to highlight and examine the 
“federalism points” where contested federal power was upheld and 
reinforced and those where state sovereignty prevailed. Those 
“points”—both in the sense of cartographic points on the newly 
drawn map where each sovereign is allowed to govern following the 
term’s federal and state struggles, and in the sense of the points made 
or scored by various Justices in the process of disagreement—tell us 
a great deal about the current state of affairs and the nature of the 
Court’s ongoing conflict. I use the Court’s deeply divided decision 
upholding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 
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(the ACA),
2
 its equally divided decision holding that Congress 
lacked constitutional authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity 
from damages suits under the self-care provision of the Family and 
Medical Leave Act,
3
 and the term’s preemption decisions—
especially the successful challenge to three of four provisions of the 
stringent Arizona law aimed at restricting aliens not lawfully present 
in the United States
4
—to identify and critique these federalism 
points. 
II.  FEDERAL POWER, STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE ACA 
The 900-plus page ACA is one of the most complex and 
politically controversial pieces of legislation ever enacted. It sets out 
a comprehensive program seeking to produce health insurance 
coverage for millions of people who lack it and simultaneously 
reduces the cost of health care. Among the ACA’s multitude of 
provisions, federalism-based constitutional challenges to Congress’s 
power were leveled at two key ones: (1) the so-called individual 
mandate provision that requires most, but not all, of the populace 
either to maintain “minimum essential” health insurance coverage or, 
for those who fail to do so and are not exempt (primarily because 
their income is too low), to make a “shared responsibility 
payment”—described by the ACA as a “penalty”—to the IRS; and 
(2) the Medicaid expansion provision, requiring States to expand the 
scope and coverage of their existing, largely federally funded 
Medicaid programs—which help provide medical care to pregnant 
women, children, needy families, the blind, the elderly, and the 
disabled—to now cover a much larger segment of the population 
(primarily a much larger group of the poor) as well. The ACA offers 
to pay for most, but not all, of the required expansion, and it provides 
that a State failing to comply with the new coverage requirements 
risks losing not just the funds for the required expansion, but all of its 
federal Medicaid funds. 
The ACA addressed a wide range of health insurance issues, at 
least two of which prompted the adoption of the individual 
mandate—the costly use of emergency medical care by those without 
 
 2. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 3. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012). 
 4. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
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insurance who by virtue of federal and state law could not be denied 
care, and the inability of individuals with pre-existing serious health 
conditions to obtain affordable or any insurance. Congress enacted 
the “guaranteed issue” requirement to prohibit insurers from limiting 
or denying altogether health insurance for individuals with pre-
existing conditions, and it adopted the “community rating” 
requirement for insurance policy pricing to prohibit insurers from 
charging higher premiums to those individuals. As several States had 
discovered earlier, however, those measures introduced a strong 
incentive for uninsured individuals to wait until they became ill 
before buying the insurance that could no longer be denied them. The 
individual mandate sought to enlarge the insurance risk pool to 
include more currently healthy people so that insurers would not be 
placed in a financially unviable situation that would lead them either 
to leave the market or to charge even higher insurance premiums to 
those who maintained insurance. 
Twenty-six states, some private individuals, and the National 
Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) sued, seeking to have the 
individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion provisions 
invalidated for lack of federal power to adopt them, and then to have 
the entire ACA invalidated on the ground that these provisions could 
not be severed from the remainder of the Act. The Court heard a 
remarkable three days of oral argument on whether the Tax Anti-
Injunction Act barred the suit as a prohibited effort to restrain 
collection of a tax before it is paid; whether Congress had the 
authority to enact the individual mandate pursuant to any or all of its 
enumerated commerce, necessary and proper, or taxing powers; 
whether its spending power allowed the Medicaid expansion 
program, with its particular enforcement mechanism; and whether, if 
the Court concluded that one or both of these central parts of the 
ACA were unconstitutional, it would be appropriate to sever 
whatever was held invalid from the many remaining provisions, 
without doing violence to the ACA’s overall scheme. 
On the final day of the term, the Court issued its sharply divided 
ruling in the already famous case of National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB).
5
 Technically, Chief Justice 
Roberts authored an opinion for a majority of the Court (comprised 
 
 5. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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of himself and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) 
resolving only two issues in the case. First, the majority held that the 
Anti-Injunction Act did not apply because the suit was not one to 
restrain collection of a tax within the meaning of that statute.
6
 
Second, reaching the merits, the Court held that the individual 
mandate reasonably could be—and therefore should be—construed 
for constitutional purposes to be an exercise of Congress’s power to 
tax and that, as such, Congress had ample authority to adopt it.
7
 
The remainder of the Chief Justice’s lead opinion did not 
officially garner a majority, but the Court as a whole reached other 
majority conclusions, despite the absence of a majority opinion. 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito filed a joint dissent 
arguing in favor of invalidating the entire ACA, because in their 
view Congress lacked power to adopt either the individual mandate 
or the Medicaid expansion, and those provisions could not be 
severed from the rest of the ACA. Probably out of pique that Chief 
Justice Roberts was not willing to go nearly as far as they would, the 
joint dissenters conspicuously did not join any aspect of his lead 
opinion and officially withheld any concurrence in his opinion at all, 
even though the dissent, in at least some respects, essentially 
mirrored some of the Chief Justice’s conclusions and reasoning. Like 
Chief Justice Roberts, and for the same reasons—and unlike the four 
who joined him in upholding the individual mandate as a permissible 
exercise of the taxing power—they found that Congress could not 
enact the individual mandate under its commerce and necessary and 
proper powers. Also, and again for virtually the same reasons, like 
the Chief Justice (who, in this respect, was joined by Justices Breyer 
and Kagan), the joint dissenters concluded that Congress lacked 
power under the Spending Clause to threaten states choosing not to 
 
 6. Id. at 2582–84. 
 7. Id. at 2600. Although many professional and lay critics—including the joint dissenters, 
id. at 2656 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting)—apparently thought that treating 
the individual mandate provision as not a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, but as a tax 
for purposes of whether Congress had power to enact it, was verbal legerdemain, the use of the 
same language in different ways in statutory and constitutional contexts is hardly new. Perhaps 
the most dramatic example involves Article III of the Constitution and the congressional grant of 
federal question jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Although they “use nearly identical language in 
conferring jurisdiction over actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United 
States, it is now well-established that the constitutional language reaches considerably more 
broadly than does the language of § 1331.” RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S 
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 748 (6th ed. 2009). 
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comply with the ACA’s Medicaid expansion requirements with the 
loss of all their pre-existing Medicaid funding. For the first time 
ever, largely because Medicaid funding makes up such a large 
portion of state budgets, the Court held a spending power condition 
too “coercive” of state sovereignty.
8
 In fact, on this point the 
dissenters, despite withholding their official concurrence, were 
explicit in noting that “[s]even Members of the Court agree that the 
Medicaid Expansion, as enacted by Congress, is unconstitutional.”
9
 
Furthermore, because they disagreed with the majority’s conclusion 
that the individual mandate could properly be understood as a 
permissible exercise of the taxing power, they also determined that, 
since the mandate was not a tax, the Tax Anti-Injunction Act was 
clearly inapplicable.
10
 For different reasons, then, the Court was 
unanimous in concluding that the constitutional merits of the case 
were properly before it. 
How to respond to the conclusion by seven Justices that the 
Medicaid expansion enforcement provision was unduly coercive of 
state sovereignty was the final dividing point. As noted, the joint 
dissenters believed the Medicaid expansion provision as a whole 
should be invalidated. Chief Justice Roberts, together with Justices 
Breyer and Kagan, concluded that it was enough to invalidate the 
authorization for withholding all Medicaid funds from states that did 
not choose to expand Medicaid in accordance with the ACA 
requirements, and to allow Congress to leave the states free to choose 
whether to accept the additional federal funding for Medicaid 
expansion in accordance with ACA requirements. Justices Ginsburg 
and Sotomayor contended that Congress had not exceeded its 
spending power in any respect, but—having lost on that point—they 
concurred in the judgment “that Congress may offer States funds ‘to 
expand the availability of health care, and requir[e] that States 
accepting such funds comply with the conditions on their use’” 
contained in the ACA.
11
 
When all was said and done, the Court had upheld all of the 
ACA except for the provision allowing (though not compelling) the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to withhold from states that 
 
 8. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601–07 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). 
 9. Id. at 2666–67 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 10. Id. at 2656. 
 11. Id. at 2642 (Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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do not comply with the ACA’s “new coverage requirements . . . not 
only the federal funding for those requirements, but all . . . federal 
Medicaid funds.”
12
 The power of Congress to use its taxing authority 
to support a mandate to buy health insurance by imposing a tax 
“penalty” for those who do not, and the power of Congress to use its 
conditional spending authority to induce States to undertake federal 
programs in accordance with federal requirements, so long as the 
federal funding offer is not coercively deployed, were reaffirmed. 
Still, for the first time ever, the Court held a federal spending 
condition invalid as too invasive of state autonomy. Moreover, a 
majority of Justices, whether in dictum or not—and to the surprise of 
many on all sides—rejected the power of Congress under both the 
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause to compel 
economic activity, even where Congress believed that such 
compulsion was necessary as part of a comprehensive effort to 
improve the financial condition of a vast national market involving 
health providers, consumers, and insurers. 
Much already has been written, and much more will be, about 
this major federalism episode. For some, including me, the 
majority’s unwillingness to uphold the individual mandate under the 
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause comes as an 
unwelcome and unpersuasive surprise, with quite uncertain 
implications for the future of congressional power. For others, most 
obviously the joint dissenters, the bigger surprise was that Chief 
Justice Roberts, having reached that conclusion, nonetheless was 
willing to uphold the individual mandate as an exercise of 
Congress’s taxing power. For now, leaving to others a more detailed 
analysis of the various elements of NFIB,
13
 what follows are some 
selective reflections on the major elements of, and questions raised 
by, this momentous decision. 
 
 12. Id. at 2582 (majority opinion). 
 13. Indeed, Professor Brietta Clark has conducted one such analysis in this issue of the 
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. Brietta Clark, Safeguarding Federalism by Saving Health 
Reform: Implications of National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 46 LOY. LA. L. 
REV. 541 (2013). 
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A.  Why Did Chief Justice Roberts 
Vote and Write As He Did? 
With four Justices deeply committed to upholding the individual 
mandate under any and all of the powers invoked on behalf of 
Congress, and four Justices equally committed to invalidating the 
mandate for having no source of power that justified it, speculation 
has abounded concerning Chief Justice Roberts’s divided stance, 
standing shoulder to shoulder with his more frequent allies in 
declaring new limits on the powers of Congress under the Commerce 
and Necessary and Proper Clauses, but with those more inclined to 
favor federal power on the ultimately determinative reliance on the 
Taxing Clause. The Chief Justice was also the decisive vote, given 
the same split among the other eight Justices, in determining that 
what seven Justices thought was an unconstitutionally coercive use 
of the conditional spending power could be remedied by removing 
the coercive part only and did not require invalidating the conditional 
spending Medicaid expansion program as a whole. 
Consider a number of possibilities.
14
 First is simply the 
straightforward notion that the Chief Justice was not acting 
especially strategically, but instead is genuinely committed to 
deferring to the powers of Congress so long as—and only so long 
as—Congress acts within historically understood boundaries, not 
when it attempts to exercise what he perceives to be new forms of 
authority that threaten to convert its limited, enumerated power into 
an unlimited general police power. After all, he elsewhere has 
supported federal power more unreservedly than most of his state 
sovereignty brethren in cases such as United States v. Comstock
15
 
and Arizona v. United States.
16
 Moreover, as to the holding on the 
taxing power, it is well established that the “Federal Government 
may enact a tax on an activity that it cannot authorize, forbid or 
otherwise control”;
17
 that if a legislative measure reasonably can be 
 
 14. For a lengthy analysis in support of the proposition that “[a]lthough Roberts was clearly 
pursuing legal policy goals, the fact that he was willing to vote to uphold the individual mandate 
without a clear majority for his conservative legal innovations reaffirms that his dominant interest 
was institutional rather than doctrinal,” see Tonja Jacobi, Strategy and Tactics in NFIB v. 
Sebelius 7 (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law and Econ. Series, No. 12-14), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2133045. 
 15. 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). 
 16. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), discussed infra pp. 442–53. 
 17. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2579. 
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construed in a way that will preserve its constitutionality, it should 
be;
18
 that even if an exaction is not labeled a tax, it should be 
understood to be a tax if it functions like one;
19
 and that a tax may 
have regulatory aims so long as it also raises revenue.
20
 Given that 
the individual mandate was structured in the alternative as a 
requirement to purchase health insurance or to pay a “penalty” to the 
IRS in a manner that operates a lot like taxes do, that a failure to buy 
health insurance triggers no other “negative legal consequences . . . 
beyond requiring a payment to the IRS,”
21
 and that Congress 
expected the “shared responsibility payment” to be paid by some 
four million people a year,
22
 reaching the conclusion that the 
individual mandate fell within Congress’s power to tax was hardly 
revolutionary. Even the joint dissenters did not say Congress could 
not have imposed the payment as a tax. They argued instead that 
Congress had enacted a requirement with a penalty and not a tax, so 
it could not rely on its taxing power.
23
 A little more deference to 
Congress, embracing a functional, rather than a formalistic, 
assessment of the individual mandate “penalty,” rather easily and 
reasonably renders it a tax on not buying health insurance. Perhaps 
more generally, Chief Justice Roberts is willing to extend that 
deference in circumstances that do not call for any real expansion of 
congressional authority.
24
 
Similarly, acting to preserve the conditional spending provisions 
for Medicaid expansion without putting the states that decline to 
 
 18. Id. at 2593–94. 
 19. Id. at 2595–96. 
 20. Id. at 2596. 
 21. Id. at 2597. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 2651 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 24. Chief Justice Roberts did resolve a new question in favor of Congress—namely, that the 
individual mandate, considered as a tax, was not a “direct” tax required to be “apportioned so that 
each State pays in proportion to its population” under Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 of the U.S. 
Constitution. Id. at 2598 (majority opinion). Although the joint dissenters thought that might be 
“a difficult constitutional question” that they had “no need to address,” id. at 2655 (Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting), Chief Justice Roberts rather easily concluded that a 
“tax on going without health insurance does not fall within any recognized category of direct 
tax,” because it was not a “capitation” and “plainly not a tax on the ownership of land or personal 
property.” Id. at 2599 (majority opinion). Finally, the tax was permitted because, unlike the use of 
the regulatory power, “the Constitution does not guarantee that individuals may avoid taxation 
through inactivity”; although the Taxing power may not be used as a penalty that is the equivalent 
of regulation, there was no such danger here, and the Taxing power “does not give Congress the 
same degree of control over individual behavior” that the regulatory power does. Id. at 2599–600. 
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expand it at risk of losing all their Medicaid funding may be 
understood not as a strategic effort to preserve the ACA, but rather as 
the appropriately proportionate response to the offending 
enforcement mechanism. Remedying only the condition that is 
thought to offend the Constitution is hardly a new concept,
25
 and for 
the Chief Justice to rely on the severability clause set forth in the 
chapter that authorized the withholding of all Medicaid funds, and to 
conclude that Congress would have wanted to preserve the Medicaid 
expansion program even without the stricter enforcement threat,
26
 
was more than reasonable—and completely consistent with adhering 
to state sovereignty values that left the States free to choose whether 
to accept or decline the expansion and the money that comes with it. 
Second, or possibly a more pointed way of saying the same 
thing, perhaps the Chief Justice chose to provide Congress no power 
it did not already possess, while successfully declaring new limits on 
the scope of congressional power in the name of a more robust state 
sovereignty. If his purpose was both to preserve a sense of judicial 
deference to the lawmaking powers of the Court’s co-equal branches 
and to further the state sovereignty agenda, he came as close to a 
Solomonic solution as he probably could. For a pragmatist promoting 
that particular agenda, it is doubtful that the ultimate target would be 
invalidation of the ACA per se rather than the curtailment of 
congressional power generally. 
Third, as many have speculated, the Chief Justice might well 
have borrowed from the constitutional maneuver his predecessor 
Chief Justice John Marshall deployed in Marbury v. Madison
27
 and 
declared limits on congressional power—and a robust role for the 
judiciary to enforce those limits (federalism limits this time)—
without risking the sort of popular backlash that could call forth 
serious reactions that might put the Court’s legitimacy at risk. 
Already having provoked powerful negative reactions from its 
decisions in Bush v. Gore
28
 and Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission,
29
 the Court might have seemed gratuitously provocative 
had it invalidated the signature accomplishment of the administration 
 
 25. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974). 
 26. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607–08 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). 
 27. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 28. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 29. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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of President Obama, and the Democratic majority that had been in 
place when the ACA was enacted, in the midst of the 2012 
presidential campaign where the question of whether to repeal or 
continue with the ACA was a hotly contested national issue dividing 
the political parties and the populace. Given what the Chief Justice 
otherwise could accomplish, why risk making the Court’s behavior 
itself more of a campaign issue? There is no reason to doubt that the 
Chief Justice’s regard for the Supreme Court as an institution is both 
deep and authentic, so even if there was little risk of defiance of a 
judgment invalidating the ACA, there was every reason to avoid 
inciting unnecessary antagonism toward the Court. 
Fourth, it is also possible that the Chief Justice recoiled 
somewhat from what seemed to be a relentless and determined quest 
of the joint dissenters to destroy the ACA altogether. At each turn, 
the opinion of the joint dissenters aggressively resists the ACA: they 
found the individual mandate beyond the commerce and necessary 
and proper powers of Congress and refused to accept that it could be 
understood as an exercise of the taxing power; they found not only 
that the Medicaid expansion enforcement provision exceeds the 
conditional spending power of Congress, but that the only proper 
remedy would be to strike the whole Medicaid expansion policy, 
because otherwise “States that decline the Medicaid Expansion must 
subsidize, by the federal tax dollars taken from their citizens, vast 
grants to the States that accept the Medicaid Expansion”;
30
 and, 
having found both the individual mandate and the Medicaid 
expansion provisions unconstitutional, they determined that 
Congress would not have wanted the rest of the ACA’s wide-ranging 
provisions to stand. The fact that the joint dissent followed this “for 
want of a nail, the kingdom was lost” course of reasoning and then 
asserted that its approach was the judicially modest one—in contrast 
to the approach the Chief Justice ultimately took for a majority, 
which the joint dissent described as “vast judicial overreaching” 
because it created “a debilitated, inoperable version of health-care 
regulation that Congress did not enact and the public does not 
expect”
31
—easily could have prompted the reaction that judicial 
modesty did, indeed, lie in something less than wholesale undoing of 
 
 30. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2676 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 31. Id. 
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what Congress had labored long and hard—and yes, 
controversially—to do. To be sure, the individual mandate and the 
Medicaid expansion components of the ACA were much more than 
just horseshoe nails in relation to a kingdom, but had the joint dissent 
been the majority opinion, the Chief Justice might well have 
thought—as many in the public undoubtedly would have thought—
that the overweening attack on the constitutional underpinnings of 
the ACA went beyond constitutional principle—and certainly 
beyond any sense of judicial modesty—to choosing sides in the 
partisan debate about the desirability of the ACA. For many, perhaps 
including the Chief Justice, the joint dissent’s harsh approach might 
have reinforced the sense that judicial modesty would be better 
served by striking less of the ACA rather than more. 
Finally, consider a fifth variation with a somewhat more 
affirmative cast. Suppose that Chief Justice Roberts sought to choose 
an approach that left maximum space for encouraging political 
participation by the electorate at the same time that he enforced what 
he perceived to be essential limits on the power of Congress. His 
opinion certainly is written to educate not just the professional 
readers of Court opinions, but also the broader public, about the 
Court’s limited role. It emphasizes that the Members of the Court 
“possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make policy 
judgments. Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation’s elected 
leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people disagree with 
them. It is not our job to protect the people from the consequences of 
their political choices.”
32
 And at the close of his opinion, the Chief 
Justice reminds readers that “the Court does not express any opinion 
on the wisdom of the Affordable Care Act. Under the Constitution, 
that judgment is reserved to the people.”
33
 
This might seem like standard fare whenever the Court wishes to 
express the important distinction between matters of public policy 
and matters of constitutional concern, although the language does 
tend to convey a little more forcefully than is sometimes the case that 
the people have their own responsibilities for the electoral choices 
they make. Another part of his opinion adds a further note of 
political responsibility, however, that might be thought to reinforce 
 
 32. Id. at 2579 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
 33. Id. at 2608 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). 
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the sense that promoting “active liberty,” to use one of Justice 
Breyer’s developed notions,
34
 could have been one of Chief Justice 
Roberts’s aims in taking the position he did. Before explaining why 
the Medicaid expansion provision was unduly coercive, his opinion 
says this: 
Congress may attach appropriate conditions to federal 
taxing and spending programs to preserve its control over 
the use of federal funds. In the typical case we look to the 
States to defend their prerogatives by adopting “the simple 
expedient of not yielding” to federal blandishments when 
they do not want to embrace the federal policies as their 
own. The States are separate and independent sovereigns. 
Sometimes they have to act like it.
35
 
There is something in his seeming appeal to the public and the 
state authorities to undertake responsibility for public policy 
decisions with which they may disagree that can be thought to 
suggest that reliance on the Court to save them from themselves is 
inadequate and probably inappropriate. Basic ground rules may come 
from the Court, but political actors must shoulder responsibility 
themselves. 
No doubt there may be other explanations for why the Chief 
Justice followed the approach he did in NFIB. Certainly, the 
suggestions I have offered are not contradictory to each other, and 
each could form an ingredient contributing to his overall viewpoint. 
In any event, his future decisions may bear watching with some or all 
of them in mind. 
B.  The Majority View That Congress Could Not 
Impose the Individual Mandate Using Its 
Commerce and Necessary and Proper Powers 
The opinion of the joint dissenters and that of the Chief Justice, 
taken together, constituted a majority view rejecting the 
government’s two basic arguments that Congress possessed ample 
power under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses to 
 
 34. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
(2005). 
 35. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.) 
(quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923)). 
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impose on individuals a requirement to purchase health insurance.
36
 
Those Justices argued that the individual mandate could not be 
justified either on the basis that the cumulative failure of many 
people to purchase health insurance substantially affects interstate 
commerce in the economically dominant healthcare and health 
insurance markets, or on the ground that the mandate was a 
necessary and proper means to further the ACA’s “guaranteed issue” 
and “community rating” reforms adopted to improve the functioning 
of those markets—reforms that clearly do regulate the economic 
activity of health insurers and thus fall within the commerce power. 
The fundamental fault these Justices perceived was that while 
Congress may regulate pre-existing activity that in the aggregate 
substantially affects interstate commerce, it may not compel people 
who choose to refrain from entering a market to engage in economic 
activity in the first place. Ordering unwilling or uninterested buyers 
to purchase a product does not fall within the power “to regulate 
Commerce,” they asserted, because that regulatory power applies 
only to control of those who engage in activity and not those who, 
for their own reasons, are inactive in a particular market. So even if it 
is true that the failure of many people to buy health insurance exerts 
a powerful economic effect on the cost of health insurance premiums 
to many others, and may have other substantial detrimental effects on 
interstate commerce, Congress lacks power to direct those people to 
become participants in the market. 
The driving force behind this conclusion evidently was the 
fundamental structural principle that the federal government is one of 
limited, enumerated powers, which these Justices believed would be 
violated if Congress could compel unwanted economic transactions, 
because in their view Congress would then possess unlimited 
regulatory authority. Adherence to that view also then defeated the 
Necessary and Proper Clause argument, because even if the 
individual mandate was necessary or useful to make effective the 
ACA’s other insurance reforms designed to end the practice of 
denying, or rendering unaffordable, health insurance for people with 
pre-existing conditions, it was not a “proper” means for 
accomplishing those goals, since it entailed “violat[ing] the 
 
 36. See id. at 2584–93 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.), 2644–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & 
Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
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background principle of enumerated (and hence limited) federal 
power,” as the joint dissenters put it.
37
 Moreover, only from that 
perspective can one make sense of Chief Justice Roberts’s otherwise 
remarkable concession that “[t]o an economist, perhaps, there is no 
difference between activity and inactivity; both have measurable 
economic effects on commerce. But the distinction between doing 
something and doing nothing would not have been lost on the 
Framers.”
38
 
Nor were these Justices willing to accept the possibility that a 
health insurance mandate could be distinguished from other purchase 
mandates based on its claimed unique characteristics—namely, that 
it would finance health care that virtually everyone will need at some 
unpredictable time, and that, unlike any other product or service, 
state and federal law require “a certain degree” of health care to be 
provided even to those who cannot pay.
39
 An exception for health 
insurance as a unique product could have allowed Congress to 
compel purchase here without allowing it to mandate purchases 
generally and thus to honor the concern about federal power 
becoming unlimited, but the joint dissenters and Chief Justice 
Roberts refused to accept that argument either. 
This is not the place to delve deeply into the course on which 
this majority may have set the Court in future challenges to 
congressional exercises of the commerce and necessary and proper 
powers. It is enough to make a few key observations. Nonobvious 
lines will have to be drawn between activity and inactivity, so that 
permissible regulations and prohibitions can be distinguished from 
impermissible requirements to enter commerce. More significant, 
perhaps, is the wide range of potential implications for congressional 
power when future challenges are premised on the claim that a 
congressional act violates background principles of limited federal 
power. The structural principle invoked has an elasticity to it that 
could encompass an awful lot of judicial discretion to restrict 
congressional power, and that especially might be so if it is invoked 
not only to reduce the scope of the commerce power, but almost by 
definition to curtail the scope of the necessary and proper power as 
well. Indeed, enforced in an aggressive manner, this understanding of 
 
 37. Id. at 2646 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 38. Id. at 2589 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
 39. Id. at 2585–87. 
  
428 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:411 
the necessary and proper power could make it a “truism” that 
whatever regulation is not found to fit within an independent power 
of Congress cannot be justified under the necessary and proper 
power either.
40
 
As Charles Black reminded us long ago,
41
 structural 
constitutional interpretation done well has much to commend it. But 
was the structural interpretation of the majority here done well? 
Consider several reasons for skepticism. To begin with, the 
majority perceived the individual mandate to be an aggressive new 
attempt on the part of Congress to expand its power, heightening the 
sense that Congress was reaching toward an unlimited regulatory 
authority. Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that “[l]egislative 
novelty is not necessarily fatal; there is a first time for everything.”
42
 
But, he argued, “new conceptions of federal power” should be 
assessed cautiously.
43
 Professor Einer Elhauge has disputed the 
novelty claim, however, pointing out that “[i]n 1790, the very first 
Congress—which incidentally included 20 framers [of the 
Constitution]—passed a law that included a mandate: namely, a 
requirement that ship owners buy medical insurance for their 
seamen,” and that “in 1798, Congress addressed the problem that the 
employer mandate to buy medical insurance for seamen covered 
drugs and physician services but not hospital stays” by “enact[ing] a 
federal law requiring the seamen to buy hospital insurance for 
themselves.”
44
 Perhaps (although not obviously) that individual 
insurance mandate might have been thought justified by the 
commerce power in a way that could distinguish it from the ACA 
mandate, or by another power of Congress, such as the power to 
regulate maritime matters. Nevertheless, Professor Elhauge is 
 
 40. A far different “truism” was famously declared by the Court in United States v. Darby, 
312 U.S. 100 (1941), where Justice Stone wrote that the Tenth Amendment “states but a truism 
that all is retained which has not been surrendered.” Id. at 124. 
 41. See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Ox Bow Press 1985) (1969) (arguing that constitutional interpretation 
may and often should be predicated upon inferences drawn from the structural features of the 
governmental branches and sovereigns recognized in the Constitution and the relationships 
among them). 
 42. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Einer Elhauge, If Health Insurance Mandates Are Unconstitutional, Why Did the 
Founding Fathers Back Them?, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com 
/article/politics/102620/individual-mandate-history-affordable-care-act, reprinted in OBAMACARE 
ON TRIAL 2, 2 (Smashwords ed. 2012). 
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persuasive in arguing that these early episodes at least demonstrate 
that close to the Founding there was no dispute as to whether an 
individual insurance mandate was a “proper” means of exercising 
federal power
45
—and certainly an individual mandate was not 
opposed as a severe threat to the structural division of power 
between the nation and the states. 
More fundamentally, the claim that upholding the individual 
mandate would remove any limits on the power of Congress under 
the Commerce Clause is highly implausible. Leaving aside for the 
moment the more than reasonable possibility of distinguishing the 
mandate to buy health insurance from mandates to buy other goods 
or services, the Court’s decisions in United States v. Lopez
46
 and 
United States v. Morrison
47
 impose judicially enforceable limits on 
the commerce power that easily would have survived upholding the 
mandate. In those cases, the Court majority thought the local 
activities regulated—gun possession near schools in the former, and 
gender-motivated violence in the latter—were insufficiently 
economic in themselves, and too remotely connected from impacts 
on interstate commerce, to justify their regulation by Congress.
48
 The 
individual mandate, by contrast, represents an economic subject of 
regulation closely connected to a significant impact on the interstate 
insurance and healthcare markets.
49
 Far from being an arguably 
gratuitous, pretextual exercise of the commerce power in the interest 
of controlling noneconomic behavior, the individual mandate is 
squarely aimed at solving a national economic problem of huge 
proportions. 
Furthermore, the line between economic activity and economic 
inactivity at bottom is a poor proxy for what should distinguish those 
regulatory objects that do and do not fall within the commerce 
 
 45. Einer Elhauge, A Response to Critics on the Founding Fathers and Health Insurance 
Mandates, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/102739 
/individual-mandates-history-maritime-law, reprinted in OBAMACARE ON TRIAL 4, 4 
(Smashwords ed. 2012); Einer Elhauge, A Further Response to Critics on the Founding Fathers 
and Insurance Mandates, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 21, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/article 
/politics/102840/health-insurance-individual-mandate-obamacare-constitutionality-framers, 
reprinted in OBAMACARE ON TRIAL 7, 7–8 (Smashwords ed. 2012). 
 46. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 47. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 48. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2623–24 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
 49. Id. at 2611. 
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power. Consider, for example, that under Wickard v. Filburn,
50
 
Congress was authorized to prohibit the production of wheat to be 
consumed locally on the farm, in part to influence the farmer to 
purchase wheat in the interstate market when he would prefer to 
refrain from that purchase,
51
 because the “stimulation of commerce is 
a use of the regulatory function quite as definitely as prohibitions or 
restrictions thereon,”
52
 whereas under a majority view in NFIB the 
individual mandate is held not to be. To be sure, in the former there 
is no absolute coercion to buy, but the practical difference is small, 
and the economic objective is the same. More fundamentally, if there 
is to be judicial enforcement limiting the scope of congressional 
power “to regulate Commerce,” rather than reliance on the political 
safeguards of federalism to police the definition of acceptable forms 
of regulation,
53
 the proper structural principle, in the words of Chief 
Justice Rehnquist in Morrison, “requires a distinction between what 
is truly national and what is truly local.”
54
 Any correspondence 
between the activity/inactivity distinction and the truly national/truly 
local distinction would be coincidental, however, and the individual 
insurance mandate in the context of the ACA surely could be 
presented as a prime instance of where the economic inactivity of 
millions who fail to purchase health insurance is a severe and direct 
threat to the national economy. 
The joint dissent explicitly disputes the notion that the powers of 
Congress should be interpreted with an eye toward facilitating its 
capacity to solve national economic problems, however serious. It 
firmly asserts that “Article I contains no whatever-it-takes-to-solve-
a-national-problem power.”
55
 This may be fine rhetoric, but is it 
good constitutional law, especially as applied in the interstate health 
insurance context? 
The Constitutional Convention initially approved conferring on 
Congress power to serve “the general interests of the Union,” before 
the Committee of Detail later drafted—without the slightest 
 
 50. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 51. Id. at 127. 
 52. Id. at 128. 
 53. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2624 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197–98 
(1824). 
 54. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000). 
 55. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2650. 
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indication that it was revising the earlier consensus—the list of 
enumerated powers in Article I that was ultimately adopted; and 
from that time forward, our nation has continued to debate whether 
those enumerated powers should be construed expansively enough to 
further the aim of empowering Congress to be able to address “the 
general interests of the Union,” or more restrictively to further the 
aim of circumscribing national power.
56
 That is not to abjure the 
structural principle that there are limits on the commerce power, but 
rather to suggest that there is also an opposing structural principle 
that those limits should not be interpreted so stringently as to 
hamstring Congress’s ability to attend to “the general interests of the 
Union.” Ultimately, the Court is responsible for identifying the 
appropriate balance between these two structural imperatives, and it 
will be interesting to see whether Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting 
prediction proves correct that, “if history is any guide,” the 
majority’s categorical stance against purchase mandates “will not 
endure.”
57
 
C.  The State Sovereignty Limit 
on Congress’s Spending Power 
The constitutional holding that garnered the support of the most 
Justices in NFIB is also the holding most likely to generate more 
litigation. The Court had never before held unconstitutional on 
federalism grounds a threat by Congress to withhold funding from 
states that refused to implement a federal program. Although the 
Court previously had made clear that the power of Congress to spend 
its revenue “for the . . . general Welfare of the United States”
58
 
includes the power to offer federal funds on conditions that would 
influence or induce states to regulate in ways that Congress desired, 
it also had indicated that at some point funding pressure could be so 
coercive as to become the equivalent of an impermissible, 
involuntary mandate for states to do the bidding of Congress. In 
 
 56. See JONATHAN D. VARAT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 130–
34 (13th ed. 2009).; see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2615 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (citing N. Am. Co. v. Sec. Exch. 
Comm’n, 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946), for the proposition that “[the commerce power] is an 
affirmative power commensurate with the national needs”). 
 57. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2625 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in 
part, and dissenting in part). 
 58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
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Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
59
 for example, which rejected a claim 
of coercion of state policy choices, the Court first raised the question 
of whether “the exertion of a power akin to undue influence . . . can 
ever be applied with fitness to the relations between state and 
nation,” but then said that “[e]ven on that assumption the location of 
the point at which pressure turns into compulsion, and ceases to be 
inducement, would be a question of degree,—at times, perhaps, of 
fact.”
60
 The Court was convinced that the congressional spending 
program to induce the creation of state unemployment compensation 
systems meeting federal criteria did “not go beyond the bounds of 
power.”
61
 As for where the boundary might lie, the Court demurred: 
“[w]e do not fix the outermost line. Enough for present purposes that 
wherever the line may be, this statute is within it. Definition more 
precise must abide the wisdom of the future.”
62
 
Two such subsequent cases, South Dakota v. Dole
63
 and New 
York v. United States,
64
 also declined to find that federal spending 
conditions had crossed the line, and they found no need to fix the line 
either. In Dole, the Court found “the argument as to coercion . . . to 
be more rhetoric than fact” because Congress had “offered relatively 
mild encouragement to the States to enact higher minimum drinking 
ages than they would otherwise choose.”
65
 In New York, the Court 
held, among other things, that the “Federal Government may not 
compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory 
program”
66
 and that a requirement that states either regulate the 
disposal of low-level radioactive waste in conformity with federal 
policy, or take title to the waste generated within their borders, was 
the equivalent of the forbidden compulsion.
67
 Of particular relevance 
here, the Court also concluded that Congress was well within its 
spending power to offer financial incentives to states to achieve 
federally prescribed deadlines for addressing the radioactive waste 
problem.
68
 
 
 59.  301 U.S. 458, 590 (1937). 
 60. Id. at 590. 
 61. Id. at 591. 
 62. Id. 
 63. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 64. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 65. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. 
 66. New York, 505 U.S. at 188. 
 67. Id. at 174–77. 
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In the portion of his NFIB opinion joined by Justices Breyer and 
Kagan, Chief Justice Roberts first articulated the importance of 
“ensuring that Spending Clause legislation does not undermine the 
status of the states as independent sovereigns in our federal 
system.”
69
 Previous exercises of conditional federal spending 
programs were distinguishable from the Medicaid expansion 
provisions of the ACA, he argued, because of the nature and size of 
the threat of having all Medicaid funds removed if states did not go 
along: 
We have upheld Congress’s authority to condition the 
receipt of funds on the States’ complying with restrictions 
on the use of those funds, because that is the means by 
which Congress ensures that the funds are spent according 
to its view of the “general Welfare.” Conditions that do not 
here govern the use of the funds, however, cannot be 
justified on that basis. When, for example, such conditions 
take the form of threats to terminate other significant 
independent grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a 
means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes.
70
 
Unlike the spending condition in Dole, “the ‘financial 
inducement’ Congress has chosen is much more than ‘relatively mild 
encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”
71
 The “threatened loss of 
less than half of one percent of South Dakota’s budget left that State 
with a ‘prerogative’ to reject Congress’s desired policy, ‘not merely 
in theory but in fact.’”
72
 In contrast, the “threatened loss of over 10 
percent of a State’s overall budget . . . is economic dragooning that 
leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid 
expansion.”
73
 Like the Court in Steward Machine, the Chief Justice 
found “no need to fix a line either. It is enough for today that 
wherever that line may be, this statute is surely beyond it.”
74
 
The joint dissenters essentially agreed, but they took into 
account a somewhat different range of considerations. They 
emphasized that “Congress effectively engages in . . . impermissible 
 
 69. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.). 
 70. Id. at 2603–04 (emphasis added). 
 71. Id. at 2604. 
 72. Id. at 2604–05. 
 73. Id. at 2605. 
 74. Id. at 2606. 
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compulsion when state participation in a federal spending program is 
coerced, so that the States’ choice whether to enact or administer a 
federal regulatory program is rendered illusory.”
75
 They said that 
“[w]hether federal spending legislation crosses the line from 
enticement to coercion is often difficult to determine, and courts 
should not conclude that legislation is unconstitutional on this 
ground unless the coercive nature of an offer is unmistakably 
clear.”
76
 Here, though, “there can be no doubt.”
77
 That was in part 
because “Medicaid has long been the largest federal program of 
grants to the States”
78
 and the “States are far less reliant on federal 
funding for any other program.”
79
 It was in part because states 
“forced out of the Medicaid program would face burdens in addition 
to the loss of federal Medicaid funding,” since other funded 
programs rely on the assumption of Medicaid.
80
 And it was also in 
part because Congress expressly assumed, as part of its goal of near-
universal health care coverage, “that no State could possibly refuse 
the offer that the ACA extends.”
81
 
Left somewhat unclear are a few matters likely to be the subject 
of future litigation. Most obviously, if one half of one percent of a 
state’s budget is considered way too little inducement to constitute 
compulsion, and more than ten percent is considered way too much, 
at what point in between will the balance tip? Is any threat of losing 
federal funds that exceed the amount offered to support the federal 
program enough to make the threat coercive? Is it a question of how 
reliant the state is on the particular federal dollars at risk? How big a 
proportion of a state’s budget is at stake? And what weight should be 
given to the expectations of Congress as to the likelihood that states 
will be able to resist the influence of the federal funding? 
In her dissent, joined by Justice Sotomayor, Justice Ginsburg 
contended that the “coercion inquiry . . . appears to involve political 
judgments that defy judicial calculation.”
82
 She anticipated that 
 
 75. Id. at 2660 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 76. Id. at 2662. 
 77. Id. 
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 79. Id. at 2663. 
 80. Id. at 2664. 
 81. Id. 
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“future Spending Clause challenges” are now likely to arrive, and 
she asked some of the questions raised in the previous paragraph 
about how the Court will go about answering them, as well as a few 
others, such as whether it matters if a state has unused state tax 
alternatives to make up for federal revenue that might be lost, and 
whether state officials might feel coerced into accepting politically 
popular federal grants for fear of losing re-election.
83
 
Perhaps there in fact will be more litigation in the future about 
the permissibility of federal spending conditions as a result of NFIB, 
and perhaps some of those challenges will be quite difficult to 
resolve. Yet it seems unlikely that resolving them will be 
inordinately or uniquely difficult. Following the joint dissent’s 
suggestion that only “unmistakably clear” instances of coercion 
should be held impermissible could go a long way toward 
ameliorating concerns of judicial overreaching. Moreover, if the 
Court is to enforce what it perceives to be core structural federalism 
principles as effectively as it does core individual rights principles, 
those sorts of difficult decisions are likely necessary and attainable. 
It may be worth noting that in the context of the exercise of 
constitutionally protected individual liberties, the Court also has 
drawn a sharp distinction between refusing to subsidize the exercise 
of such liberties, on the one hand, and penalizing them by 
withdrawing unrelated government financial support, on the other. 
So, for example, in the process of rejecting the claim that Congress 
had unconstitutionally “penalized” a woman’s choice to abort her 
fetus by repeatedly enacting the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits 
the use of federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the 
Medicaid program, the Court made the following relevant 
observations: 
A substantial constitutional question would arise if 
Congress had attempted to withhold all Medicaid benefits 
from an otherwise eligible candidate simply because that 
candidate had exercised her constitutionally protected 
freedom to terminate her pregnancy by abortion. This 
would be analogous to Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 
where this Court held that a State may not, consistent with 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, withhold all 
 
 83. Id. at 2640–41. 
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unemployment compensation benefits from a claimant who 
would otherwise be eligible for such benefits but for the fact 
that she is unwilling to work one day per week on her 
Sabbath. But the Hyde Amendment, unlike the statute at 
issue in Sherbert, does not provide for such a broad 
disqualification from receipt of public benefits. Rather, the 
Hyde Amendment . . . represents simply a refusal to 
subsidize certain protected conduct. A refusal to fund 
protected activity, without more, cannot be equated with the 
imposition of a “penalty” on that activity.
84
 
Likewise, it should not be that surprising to expect that when the 
Court is constitutionally committed to protecting the regulatory and 
fiscal autonomy of the states from impairment by Congress through 
the manipulation of its conditional spending power, the Court would 
embrace the same distinction between permissible refusals to fund 
and impermissible leveraging of financial influence to penalize states 
who refuse to go along with the ACA’s Medicaid expansion by 
withholding more than the funds for the expansion program—in this 
case, a lot more. For Congress “to withhold all Medicaid benefits 
from an otherwise eligible [state] simply because that [state] had 
exercised [its] constitutionally protected freedom” to make its own 
policy choices pursuant to a fundamental structural principle of state 
autonomy also raises a “substantial constitutional question.”
85
 It is 
the “broad disqualification from receipt of public benefits” that can 
turn permissible influence into impermissible coercion.
86
 
The emphasis that Chief Justice Roberts placed on spending 
conditions that “take the form of threats to terminate other significant 
independent grants”
87
 is fully in accord with the Court’s approach to 
penalties on the exercise of protected individual rights, both in 
holding unduly coercive the threat to withdraw all Medicaid funding 
from states that would not agree to the expansion, and in concluding 
that all that was necessary to remedy the constitutional violation was 
removal of that threat. Perhaps that is why, in addition to the “active 
 
 84. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980). 
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liberty” point made earlier,
88
 Justices Breyer and Kagan concurred in 
that portion of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion. 
III.  CONGRESS’S CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT 
POWER EBBS, AS STATE IMMUNITY SWELLS 
Unlike the outcome in NFIB, another of the Court’s decisions 
this past Term, Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland,
89
 was a 
complete victory for state sovereignty. The Court, with no majority 
opinion and four expected dissenters,
90
 held that Congress exceeded 
its power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it 
sought to authorize suits for damages against state employers who 
failed to comply with that part of the Family and Medical Leave Act 
of 1993 (FMLA) that generally requires all employers to grant 
unpaid leave to employees with a serious medical condition so that 
they might care for themselves.
91
 Justice Kennedy announced the 
Court’s judgment and authored a plurality opinion joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, but Justice Scalia 
concurred only in the judgment, taking an even narrower view of 
Congress’s power to abrogate state immunity than the plurality did.
92
 
Fifteen years ago, a majority of the Court, in the path-changing 
decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,
93
 introduced a new effort to 
confine the power of Congress under section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which grants Congress power to “enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions” of the Amendment.
94
 The 
author there, too, was Justice Kennedy, who construed the scope of, 
and judicially enforceable limits on, the section 5 power in these 
terms: 
Congress’ power under § 5 . . . extends only to 
“enforc[ing]” the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court has described this power as “remedial” . . . . The 
 
 88. See supra p. 425. 
 89. 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012). 
 90. Justice Ginsburg wrote the dissent, joined in full by Justice Breyer, and by Justices 
Sotomayor and Kagan in all but footnote 1, which reiterated the view, previously rejected by the 
Court, that “Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I Commerce 
Clause power.” Id. at 1339 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 91. Id. at 1338 (plurality opinion). 
 92. Id. at 1338–39 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 93. 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority 
when it enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). 
 94. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
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design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are 
inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the 
power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s restrictions on the States . . . Congress does 
not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right 
is. It has been given the power “to enforce,” not the power 
to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation . . . . 
 
While the line between measures that remedy or 
prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a 
substantive change in the governing law is not easy to 
discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in 
determining where it lies, the distinction exists and must be 
observed. There must be a congruence and proportionality 
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the 
means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, 
legislation may become substantive in operation and 
effect.
95
 
At least two sorts of restrictions on congressional power were 
introduced by this approach. First, and most fundamentally, 
Congress could not enforce what it might believe, contrary to the 
Court’s view, the Fourteenth Amendment properly should be 
understood to forbid.
96
 Second, despite the promise that Congress 
“must have wide latitude in determining” where the line between 
remedying or preventing unconstitutional actions and substantively 
changing the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment lies, the Court 
has administered the “congruence and proportionality” standard in a 
fashion that places an increasingly heavy burden on Congress to 
demonstrate with substantial evidence that its measures are remedial 
or preventative.
97
 
 
 95. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519–20 (citation omitted). 
 96. For a fully developed contrary perspective proposing that “for purposes of Section 5 
power the Constitution should be regarded as having multiple interpreters, both political and 
legal” and that specifically would attribute “equal interpretive authority to Congress and to the 
Court,” grounded in the view that this “model of polycentric constitutional interpretation . . . 
more accurately reflects the understandings and practices that make up our constitutional practice 
than does the enforcement model,” see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative 
Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical 
Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1947 (2003). 
 97. See id. at 1964 (“As the Rehnquist Court has begun to insist that the term ‘enforce’ 
excludes the power to ‘interpret,’ it has also begun decisively to repudiate the deferential 
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The “congruence and proportionality” hurdle that Congress must 
overcome applies not only to its direct efforts to define the scope of 
the rights to equal protection and due process contained in section 1 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, but also to the power of Congress—
as a remedial or preventive measure to enforce Fourteenth 
Amendment rights—to remove whatever immunity to suit the States 
otherwise would have. That was the issue in Coleman, as it had been 
in a number of earlier cases,
98
 particularly in Nevada Department of 
Human Resources v. Hibbs,
99
 which held, 6–3, that Congress 
possessed section 5 power to abrogate state sovereign immunity and 
authorize suits for damages against state employers who violated the 
provisions of the FMLA requiring them to provide unpaid leave to 
employees seeking time off for family care, rather than self-care. 
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Coleman distinguished 
Hibbs (from which Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, had dissented) on the basis that in Hibbs there was 
“evidence that States had family-leave policies that differentiated on 
the basis of sex and that States administered even neutral family-
leave policies in ways that discriminated on the basis of sex,”
100
 
whereas in Coleman there was no such evidence of sex 
discrimination in the administration of sick leave. Unlike with 
family-leave practices, which Congress found to be administered 
based on a pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family 
members is women’s work, the evidence before Congress suggested 
that men and women took medical leave approximately equally, and 
public employers treated self-care requests from men and women 
without gender stereotypes. Although “the self-care provision offers 
some women a benefit by allowing them to take leave for pregnancy-
related illnesses[,] . . . as a remedy, the provision is not congruent 
and proportional to any identified constitutional violations” since 
 
McCulloch standard.”); see also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 958–
59 (3d ed. 2000) (“Thus have laws enacted by Congress pursuant to § 5 suddenly been saddled 
with something between intermediate and strict scrutiny, effectuating what can only be 
understood as a substantial, albeit not conclusive, presumption of unconstitutionality.”). 
 98. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 
(2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); 
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expenses Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). For an 
early, critical view of the Florida Prepaid and Alden decisions, see TRIBE, supra note 97, at 
1374–81. 
 99. 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
 100. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1332 (2012). 
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“Congress did not document any pattern of States excluding 
pregnancy-related illnesses from sick-leave or disability-leave 
policies.”
101
 Nor did the plurality accept the argument that the self-
care provision was needed to make the family-care provisions 
effective based on the notion that the right to self-care would make it 
less likely that employers would discriminate against hiring women 
in the first place—the theory being that the more the anticipated 
leave requests by men and women seemed similar, the less likely 
employers would be to factor the fear of disproportionate leave 
requests by women into their hiring calculations.
102
 Finally, the 
plurality rejected the claim that the self-care provision was justified 
to help single parents, most of whom are women, retain their jobs 
when they become ill, for on that view Congress would have been 
targeting “neutral leave policies with a disparate impact on women,” 
which meant that the self-care provision was “not directed at a 
pattern of constitutional violations.”
103
 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in the judgment reiterated his view 
that Congress’s power under section 5 should be limited “to the 
regulation of conduct that itself violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”
104
 Since failure to grant state employees leave for self-
care did not even “come close” to that, Congress lacked the power to 
abrogate state immunity.
105
 Interestingly, Justice Scalia again called 
for abandonment of the “congruence and proportionality” test, this 
time based in part on his perception that the differing applications of 
it by the plurality and the dissent were both “faithful” to it.
106
 He 
thought the “varying outcomes” the Court arrived at using it made 
“no sense” and that the test itself both invited judicial arbitrariness 
and required inappropriate “scour[ing of] the legislative record in 
search of evidence that supports the congressional action.”
107
 
As for Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, which is especially interesting 
given her paramount role as a woman’s rights advocate in the 
Supreme Court beginning in the 1970s, it noted the FMLA’s 
repeated emphasis on the overall goal of reducing gender-based 
 
 101. Id. at 1335. 
 102. Id. at 1335–37. 
 103. Id. at 1337. 
 104. Id. at 1338 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 105. Id. at 1338–39. 
 106. Id. at 1338. 
 107. Id. 
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employment discrimination.
108
 It summarized the history of 
disagreements between “equal-treatment” feminists and “equal-
opportunity” feminists that resulted in the ultimately successful 
former group developing—and Congress embracing—“a gender-
neutral leave model, which eventually became the FMLA,” as a 
better mechanism to fight pregnancy discrimination.
109
 It urged a 
reconsideration of the Court’s decision in Geduldig v. Aiello
110
 that 
pregnancy discrimination is not the same as sex discrimination.
111
 
And it contended that even if Geduldig “senselessly holds sway,”
112
 
Congress’s adoption of the self-care leave provision was “a key part 
of Congress’ endeavor to make it feasible for women to work and 
have families,”
113
 because it would reduce the incentives employers 
might have, based on stereotypical assumptions that women 
disproportionately are inclined to ask for family leave, to not hire 
women, who were no more likely than men—and perhaps even less 
likely, if they did take more family leave—to ask for self-care leave. 
By disaggregating the self-care provision of the FMLA from the 
family-care provisions upheld in Hibbs, the Court obviously 
restricted Congress’s section 5 power further in the interest of 
bolstering state sovereign immunity. That the three dissenters in 
Hibbs were in the majority in Coleman, together with Chief Justice 
Roberts (who replaced Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author of Hibbs) 
and Justice Alito (who replaced Justice O’Connor, who had joined 
the majority in Hibbs), comes as no surprise. Although it is difficult 
to say with certainty, the new majority alignment might also be 
expected to limit Congress’s section 5 power even more in the 
future—even if they cannot exactly agree on how much, or on what 
the proper criteria for evaluation should be. 
The severity of the demands imposed on Congress by the 
Coleman plurality to justify the exercise of its enforcement powers is 
somewhat disturbing. It is at least a little ironic that a Court that 
insists in the context of affirmative action policies that race-neutral 
 
 108. Id. at 1340 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The FMLA’s purpose and legislative history 
reinforce the conclusion that the FMLA, in its entirety, is directed at sex discrimination.”). 
 109. Id. at 1340–42. 
 110. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
 111. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1344–45 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 112. Id. at 1347. 
 113. Id. at 1349. 
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means be preferred to race-conscious ones
114
 should be so 
begrudging about Congress’s use of sex-neutral means to address its 
overall concerns about sex discrimination in the workplace through 
all the provisions of the FMLA operating together. In any event, 
Coleman appears to move further down the path of judicial limitation 
of congressional power in order to enhance state sovereign 
immunity, and seems to have largely abandoned the promise that, 
even under the “congruence and proportionality” test, Congress 
would be afforded deference, much less “wide latitude.” Further 
steps down that path may be anticipated, whether in this context or in 
others. 
IV.  OF PRECEDENT AND PREEMPTION 
The preemption doctrine, which asks whether particular 
elements of state law are superseded under the Supremacy Clause
115
 
by federal law or policy, naturally is an important battle site where 
federal power and state sovereignty forces clash. Professor Ernest 
Young suggests, in fact, “that while cases about the reach of the 
Commerce Clause or the scope of state sovereign immunity grab the 
headlines, preemption cases make up the functional heart of the 
Court’s federalism doctrine.”
116
 Whether that is a fully accurate 
assessment or not, or is in any event subject to change as the Court 
introduces more limits on the scope of congressional power, as it did 
this past Term, there is no doubt of preemption’s importance for 
understanding our constitutional federalism.
117
 
The Court decided three preemption cases in October Term 
2011, sustaining almost all the claims in each that federal law 
 
 114. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 115. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 116. Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against 
Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 254 (2012). 
 117. Professor Young believes that it “is critical to approach preemption questions in ways 
that cohere with the broader concerns of constitutional federalism doctrine” and that—at least 
prior to the Court’s opinions in NFIB—preemption had “become the central question of our 
federalism” in large part because “the enumerated limits of Congress’s powers now play an 
extremely limited role in preserving the federal balance.” Id. at 306. Because of his sense that the 
Court’s post–New Deal recognition of broad congressional power produced an opposing reaction 
of greater sensitivity to interpreting Congress’s preemptive intent more narrowly so that state 
authority is not too easily eliminated, one might wonder whether he thinks the converse also 
might be true; that is, as the Court in cases like NFIB moves toward circumscribing the powers of 
Congress, should the preemptive intent of Congress when exercising power it does possess be 
read more broadly, still more narrowly, or not any differently? 
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rendered the application of challenged state law impermissible. In 
two of the cases, one well-established precedent—though a different 
precedent in each—was effectively determinative within its sphere of 
influence in support of the preemption result.
118
 A different minority 
group of Justices in each case resisted that determinative influence, 
however, and a close look at the Justices’ varying responses to 
precedents that all agreed were relevant offers a revealing glimpse of 
underlying conceptions of the proper interaction of federal and state 
authority in the preemption context, not to mention some insight into 
the perceived force of stare decisis. 
Certainly the more noticed of the two cases—involving an 
immigration regulation controversy that has attracted a huge amount 
of public attention—was Arizona v. United States.
119
 In a pre-
enforcement, facial preemption challenge brought by the United 
States, a majority of the Court addressed four provisions of 
Arizona’s S.B. 1070, a law expressly designed to “discourage and 
deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity 
by persons unlawfully present in the United States.”
120
 By a 5–3 
vote,
121
 the Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, held that federal 
law preempted three provisions of the Arizona law: section 3, which 
made failure to comply with federal alien registration requirements a 
state misdemeanor; section 5(C), which created another state 
misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage in work in 
Arizona; and section 6, which authorized state and local police 
officers to arrest without a warrant any person an officer “has 
probable cause to believe . . . has committed any public offense that 
makes [that person] removable from the United States” under federal 
 
 118. In the third decision, National Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965 (2012), the Court 
unanimously held that the express preemption provision of the Federal Meat Inspection Act 
(FMIA) prohibited application of a recent California statute that sought to control how an FMIA-
regulated slaughterhouse deals with nonambulatory pigs. The FMIA’s express preemption clause 
“prevents a State from imposing any additional or different—even if nonconflicting—
requirements that fall within the scope of the Act and concern a slaughterhouse’s facilities or 
operations.” Id. at 970. Thus, the California regulatory scheme was preempted, because it called 
for different treatment than that allowed by the FMIA. Id. at 975. The decision turned on the 
proper interpretation of the scope of the FMIA express preemption provision and did not require 
engagement with any particular judicial precedent. 
 119. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 120. Id. at 2497 (quoting the note following ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (2012)). 
 121. Id. Justice Kagan did not participate, presumably because of her involvement with the 
suit filed by the United States against Arizona when she was solicitor general. 
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law.
122
 The majority rejected, however, the facial preemption 
challenge to section 2(B)—the colloquially named “show me your 
papers” provision of S.B. 1070—which requires police officers in 
most circumstances to make a “reasonable attempt . . . to determine 
the immigration status” of anyone they stop, detain, or arrest “in the 
enforcement of any other [state or local] law or ordinance . . . where 
reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is 
unlawfully present in the United States.”
123
 Largely for three reasons 
the Court declined to assume that the state courts would construe 
section 2(B) “in a way that creates a conflict with federal law.”
 124
 
First, Congress had encouraged through statute the sharing of 
information about possible immigration violations between federal 
and state authorities.
125
 Second, under state law a valid Arizona 
driver’s license would satisfy the inquiry, and racial profiling and 
inconsistency with federal immigration regulations and federal civil 
rights guarantees were prohibited in the implementation of section 
2(B).
126
 Finally, the state courts had not had an opportunity to 
interpret the provision to allay concerns either about possible 
detentions for the sole purpose of verifying immigration status or 
about possible unduly prolonged detentions not justified by other 
state or local law,
127
 The majority was keen to say, however, that 
“[t]his opinion does not foreclose other preemption and 
constitutional challenges to the law as interpreted and applied after it 
goes into effect.”
128
 
Unsurprisingly, in order to decide these preemption challenges, 
the Court (and the parties) invoked Hines v. Davidowitz,
129
 the 
classic 1941 decision that was the most obvious precedent to be 
addressed. Hines, which invalidated a Pennsylvania alien registration 
law whose substantive requirements differed from those of the 
federal alien registration scheme in place at the time, was 
characterized (not for the first time) as “a field preemption case.”
130
 
 
 122. Id. at 2497–98. 
 123. Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 124. Id. at 2510. 
 125. Id. at 2508 (majority opinion). 
 126. Id. at 2507–08. 
 127. Id. at 2509. 
 128. Id. 
 129. 312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
 130. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502. 
  
Winter 2013] FOREWORD 445 
Under “field” preemption, state regulation of anything in the defined 
field is prohibited because Congress has determined that the field 
must be regulated by its exclusive governance.
131
 According to the 
majority, because the current federal statutory framework for alien 
registration remains “comprehensive,” and “[w]here Congress 
occupies an entire field, as it has in the field of alien registration, 
even complementary state regulation is impermissible,”
132
 Arizona 
could not punish failure to comply with federal registration 
requirements. To allow Arizona—and every other state—to do so 
would diminish federal control over enforcement. 
Justice Kennedy rejected Arizona’s contention “that § 3 can 
survive preemption because [it] has the same aim as federal law and 
adopts its substantive standards.”
133
 That argument “ignores the basic 
premise of field preemption—that States may not enter, in any 
respect, an area the Federal Government has reserved for itself.”
134
 
Allowing section 3 to operate would recognize state power “to bring 
criminal charges . . . for violating a federal law even in 
circumstances where federal officials in charge of the comprehensive 
scheme determine that prosecution would frustrate federal 
policies.”
135
 Besides, unlike the federal regulatory regime, section 3 
precluded probation and the possibility of a pardon.
136
 
The three separate concurring and dissenting opinions are 
particularly noteworthy for their treatment of Hines as applied to 
section 3. Justice Scalia would have upheld section 3 despite Hines. 
He denied that Hines established “a ‘field preemption’ that implicitly 
eliminates the States’ sovereign power to exclude those whom 
federal law excludes.”
137
 Rather, in his view, Hines only “held that 
the States are not permitted to establish ‘additional or auxiliary’ 
registration requirements for aliens.”
138
 Arizona did not do that; it 
 
 131. Id. at 2501 (citing Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 115 (1992)). 
 132. Id. at 2502. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 2503. 
 136. Id. Hines is also the source of the category of “obstacle preemption,” said to be a 
particular species of “conflict preemption,” where state law is preempted if it “stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” 
Hines, 312 U.S. at 67. The challenges to sections 5(C), 6, and 2(B) were addressed under that 
rubric. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503–10. 
 137. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2518 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 138. Id. 
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“merely ma[de] a violation of state law the very same failure to 
register and failure to carry evidence of registration that are 
violations of federal law.”
139
 Borrowing from Justice Stone’s 
dissenting opinion in Hines, Justice Scalia interpreted Hines to allow 
a state to rely on the federal registration system to aid in the 
enforcement of state laws that constitutionally could be applied to 
aliens, such as Arizona’s law denying unemployment benefits to 
illegal aliens.
140
 He dismissed the majority’s concern that more 
vigorous state enforcement of federal registration requirements might 
frustrate federal enforcement choices, because such state power 
would be “entirely appropriate when the State uses federal law (as it 
must) as the criterion for the exercise of its own power, and the 
implementation of its own policies of excluding those who do not 
belong there.”
141
 
Justice Thomas, in his separate concurring and dissenting 
opinion, also thought that “Hines at most holds that federal law pre-
empts the States from creating additional registration requirements,” 
and “here, Arizona is merely seeking to enforce the very registration 
requirements that Congress created.”
142
 Thus, section 3 was valid, 
because “nothing in the text of the relevant federal statutes indicates 
that Congress intended enforcement of its registration requirements 
to be exclusively the province of the Federal Government.”
143
 Like 
Justice Scalia, in other words, Justice Thomas defined more narrowly 
than the majority the “field” that Hines said Congress had occupied. 
Unlike Justices Scalia and Thomas, who would have upheld all 
the challenged provisions of S.B. 1070, Justice Alito, in his separate 
concurring and dissenting opinion, agreed with the Court that section 
3 was preempted “by virtue of our decision in Hines,” because “[o]ur 
conclusion in that case that Congress had enacted an ‘all-embracing 
system’ of alien registration and that States cannot ‘enforce 
additional or auxiliary regulations’ . . . forecloses Arizona’s attempt 
here to impose additional, state-law penalties for violations of the 
federal registration scheme.”
144
 Justice Alito elaborated that 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 2519. 
 142. Id. at 2523 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 2524–25 (citation omitted). 
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“[a]lthough there is some ambiguity in Hines, the Court largely 
spoke in the language of field pre-emption.”
145
 And he was clear that 
“[i]f we credit our holding in Hines that Congress has enacted ‘a 
single integrated and all-embracing system’ of alien registration and 
that States cannot ‘complement’ that system or ‘enforce additional or 
auxiliary regulations,’ then Arizona’s attempt to impose additional, 
state-law penalties for violations of federal registration requirements 
must be invalidated.”
146
 
Did Justices Scalia and Thomas fail to “credit” the holding in 
Hines? If so, what might have accounted for their deviation from the 
force of precedent? And, was the deviation—or at least such a 
crabbed reading of that precedent—justified absent any suggestion 
that Hines should be reconsidered? 
Before undertaking that examination, however, it may be useful 
to contrast the Justices’ respective approaches to Arizona v. United 
States with their approaches to another preemption case from last 
term that lacked such high visibility. Strikingly, Justice Thomas 
authored the majority opinion for six Justices that included Justice 
Scalia in Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp.,
147
 holding that 
state-law tort claims for both defective design and failure to warn 
were preempted by the federal Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA), 
because under a 1926 precedent, Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line 
Railraod Co.,
148
 Congress had preempted the entire field of 
regulating locomotive equipment.
149
 The tort suit alleged that a 
welder and machinist had contracted malignant mesothelioma while 
working with locomotive brakeshoes and engine valves that 
contained asbestos, and that the manufacturers’ defective design of 
those products and failure to warn of their danger and how to use 
them safely rendered them liable for his injuries. Justice Thomas 
noted that the claimants “do not ask us to overrule Napier and thus 
do not seek to overcome the presumption of stare decisis that 
attaches to this 85-year-old precedent.”
150
 And he rejected all their 
attempts to suggest that their claims “fall outside of the field pre-
 
 145. Id. at 2529. 
 146. Id. at 2530 (citation omitted). 
 147. 132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012). 
 148. 272 U.S. 605 (1926). 
 149. Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1264. 
 150. Id. at 1267. 
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empted by the LIA, as it was defined in Napier.”
151
 In particular, the 
Court refused to narrow the preempted field to exclude “hazards 
arising from repair and maintenance (as opposed to those arising 
from use on the line)”
152
 or to exclude at least the failure-to-warn 
claims, which, in the majority’s view were “directed at the 
equipment of locomotives” and, thus, “fall within the pre-empted 
field defined by Napier.”
153
 
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, 
concurred in part, agreeing that the LIA preempted the defective-
design claims, but she dissented from the decision to preempt the 
failure-to-warn claims.
154
 She suggested that the Court “might decide 
Napier differently today,” because it “implied field preemption from 
the LIA’s mere delegation of regulatory authority to the Interstate 
Commerce Commission” and the LIA lacked either textual language 
expressly requiring field preemption or any substantive regulations, 
“let alone a ‘scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make 
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to 
supplement it.’”
155
 Even accepting the force of this long established 
precedent and the value of “statutory stare decisis,” as did the 
majority, and concluding therefore that the “defective-design claims 
fall within the pre-empted field because they would impose state-law 
requirements on a locomotive’s physical makeup,” Justice 
Sotomayor nonetheless argued that the “failure-to-warn claims . . . 
proceed on a fundamentally different theory of tort liability that does 
not implicate a product’s physical composition at all.”
156
 
Accordingly, she thought the majority extended the field preemptive 
effect of the LIA “well beyond what Napier requires.”
157
 
Justice Kagan, who later did not participate in Arizona v. United 
States, expressed doubts similar to those expressed by Justice 
Sotomayor about whether Napier would be decided the same way 
today, because its field preemption conclusion was “based on 
nothing more than a statute granting regulatory authority over [the] 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 1267–68. 
 153. Id. at 1268. 
 154. Id. at 1271 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 155. Id. at 1271–72. 
 156. Id. at 1272. 
 157. Id. at 1275. 
  
Winter 2013] FOREWORD 449 
subject matter [of locomotive equipment] to a federal agency.”
158
 But 
she concluded that Napier meant that “the scope of the agency’s 
power” under the LIA determined “the boundaries of the preempted 
field,” and that meant, in turn, that because the agency had authority 
both to regulate the design of locomotive equipment and to require 
warnings about their safe use, both the defective-design and failure-
to-warn claims fell into the preempted field.
159
 
In the end, differing Court majorities gave both Hines and 
Napier their fullest due in Arizona v. United States and Kurns, 
respectively, applying their precedential scope broadly when 
defining the “field” that Congress had preempted. Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Alito (at least with respect to 
section 3 of S.B. 1070) followed that approach in both cases, and one 
might surmise that Justice Kagan likely would have as well, had she 
participated in both. But what about Justices Scalia and Thomas, who 
were anxious to limit the scope of field preemption in Arizona but 
not in Kurns? Or Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, who 
took the exact opposite position? Here lies a potentially illuminating 
entry into these cases. 
In several respects, the Scalia and Thomas approaches to the two 
cases are more difficult to fathom. After all, in both Hines and 
Arizona, the context is regulation of a group of people—aliens—
whose treatment inevitably might implicate sensitive foreign policy 
concerns of the United States, where singular treatment by the 
federal government is more likely to be desired. That might lead one 
to expect that any thumb on the scale of the federal/state balance 
likely would be placed on the federal preemption side, as the 
majorities in both cases did in reaching the conclusion both that 
Congress had occupied the field of alien registration regulation and 
that the scope of the field should be defined broadly enough to be 
responsive to those imperatives.
160
 By contrast, the federal interest in 
 
 158. Id. at 1270 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 159. Id. Justice Sotomayor responded that if the power to require warnings existed, that power 
was limited to “warnings that impose direct requirements on the physical composition of 
locomotive equipment” and did not extend to the failure-to-warn claims asserted in this case. Id. 
at 1275 n.3 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 160. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Arizona emphasized not only the power of 
Congress over naturalization and its inherent sovereign power to conduct foreign relations, but 
also the importance of discretion in the executive branch when enforcing immigration law, 
especially since “[s]ome discretionary decisions involve policy choices that bear on this Nation’s 
international relations.” Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012). 
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Napier and Kurns implicates only ordinary domestic concerns, 
important perhaps, but not so much so that, where an interpretive 
choice is to be made, the implicated federal interest necessarily 
should be thought to overcome the usual presumption against the 
preemption of state law.
161
 
Furthermore, there was little disagreement in Arizona that 
“[f]ederal governance of immigration and alien status is extensive 
and complex.”
162
 Indeed, whatever the full scope of the field of 
federal alien registration regulation might be, there was no doubt that 
Congress had enacted many statutes of relevance in the area. Even 
the survival of section 2(B) was the product of yet further 
congressional legislation governing cooperation in information 
sharing between federal and state authorities about the legal status of 
individual aliens.
163
 By comparison, Kurns, like Napier, drew on the 
LIA’s delegation of authority to the regulatory agency, rather than its 
extensive exercise, when defining its broad scope of field 
preemption. 
Nor can the difference be explained by the fact that no party in 
Kurns had asked for reconsideration of Napier, as Justice Thomas 
noted. Neither Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, nor anyone else 
suggested in Arizona that Hines be reconsidered rather than narrowly 
construed. 
If the federal side of the equation leaned more in the direction of 
preemption in Arizona than Kurns, then what about the state side of 
 
 161. The classic formulation of these notions comes from Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 
331 U.S. 218 (1947), where the Court explained its approach when Congress has legislated “in a 
field which the States have traditionally occupied”:  
[W]e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to 
be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress. . . . Such a purpose may be evidenced in several ways. The scheme of 
federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. . . . Or the Act of Congress may 
touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be 
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject. Likewise, the 
object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations 
imposed by it may reveal the same purpose. . . . Or the state policy may produce a 
result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute. . . . It is often a perplexing 
question whether Congress has precluded state action or by the choice of selective 
regulatory measures has left the police power of the States undisturbed except as the 
state and federal regulations collide. 
Id. at 230–31 (emphasis added). 
 162. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499. 
 163. Id. at 2508. 
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the equation? Here is where Justice Scalia in particular took a robust 
stand. His opinion argues aggressively that Arizona, like all the states 
in the Union, possesses “the defining characteristic of sovereignty: 
the power to exclude from the sovereign’s territory people who have 
no right to be there.”
164
 Although he acknowledged that since the 
founding era “primary responsibility for immigration policy has 
shifted from the States to the Federal Government,” he argued that 
“[i]mplicit ‘field preemption’ will not do” to remove “the core of 
state sovereignty: the power to exclude.”
165
 He denigrated the 
majority’s willingness to draw support for its field preemption 
conclusion from the Federal Government’s sensitivity to the 
concerns of “foreign countries . . . about the status, safety, and 
security of their nationals in the United States,”
166
 declaring that 
“[e]ven in its international relations, the Federal Government must 
live with the inconvenient fact that it is a Union of independent 
States, who have their own sovereign powers.”
167
 For Justice Scalia, 
only where Arizona law might conflict with federal immigration law 
would there be preemption. He found no conflict in any of the 
challenged parts of S.B. 1070 and no field preemption “of additional 
state penalties” for federal immigration violations.
168
 
Justice Thomas reached the same conclusion, but in a much 
simpler way. He refused to hold that Congress preempted the field of 
enforcing federal registration standards by following his proposed 
general approach that preemption should follow only from conflicts 
“between the ‘ordinary meanin[g]’ of the relevant federal laws” and 
the challenged state law provisions.
169
 Since “nothing in the text of 
the relevant federal statutes indicates that Congress intended 
enforcement of its registration requirements to be exclusively the 
province of the Federal Government,” section 3 was not 
preempted.
170
 
A charitable reading of his opinion for the Court in Kurns 
(which Justice Scalia joined), one that would make it consistent with 
 
 164. Id. at 2511 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 165. Id. at 2513–14. 
 166. Id. at 2498 (majority opinion). 
 167. Id. at 2514–15 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 168. Id. at 2519. 
 169. Id. at 2522 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Wyeth v. 
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 588 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
 170. Id. at 2523 (emphasis added). 
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his opinion in Arizona, would suggest that it was only the textual 
interpretation of the LIA in Napier that led to his view that the 
failure-to-warn, as well as the defective-design, claims were 
preempted in the former. The difference between his majority 
opinion and that of the concurring and dissenting Justices, then, 
would reduce to what the “ordinary meaning” of the LIA is. 
Although he invoked the special force of “statutory stare decisis” in 
Kurns, it is unclear why that force should not have applied equally in 
Arizona. Realistically, moreover, what the “ordinary meaning” is 
itself is a matter of some discretionary interpretive choice. No doubt 
the textualist approach is grounded in part on a belief that a linguistic 
interpretive choice is less likely to allow for judicial policy discretion 
than is an interpretive choice based on “judicially divined legislative 
purposes”
171
 that take account of background policies and contexts. 
And interestingly, there was no reference in Kurns to the 
presumption against preemption. Had there been, one might have 
thought that preserving a traditional state tort law cause of action 
might have bolstered the desire to preserve as much of state law as 
possible, as the concurring and dissenting Justices would have done 
by holding that federal law did not preempt the failure-to-warn 
claims. Certainly one might imagine the possibility that Justice 
Scalia, at least, who was so anxious in Arizona to preserve state 
power to exclude aliens unlawfully present under federal law, might 
have approached the preservation of state common law causes of 
action in similar fashion. Whether or not Justice Sotomayor’s 
opinion in Kurns is a better reading of the scope of the LIA’s 
preemptive effect as interpreted by Napier than the majority’s, it is at 
least a plausible reading, and the presumption against preemption, if 
applied, might have made all the difference in the case. As it was, 
reading Napier for all it was worth tended to serve the interest in 
reducing the potential liability of certain businesses, perhaps a not 
unwelcome consequence to a number of Justices in the majority in 
Kurns. 
In the end, the comparison of the multiple opinions in Arizona 
and Kurns highlights several points. First, the doctrines of “field 
preemption” and “obstacle” preemption are alive and well, in 
significant part due to well-established precedent. Second, 
 
 171. Id. at 2524. 
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preemption doctrine generally continues to consist of several strands. 
Dominant federal interests, pervasiveness of federal regulation, 
inquiries into federal purposes, the nature and strength of the 
particular state interests that would be sacrificed if preemption is 
found, and concerns about excessive judicial policymaking all 
remain grist for the preemption mill. Third, with the exception of 
Justice Alito, who complained in his concurring and dissenting 
opinion in Arizona that the Court there gave “short shrift to our 
presumption against pre-emption,”
172
 that presumption was largely 
absent in the analyses. In Arizona, that might signify what seems to 
be a pretty consistent Court view that when “the field is one that is 
traditionally deemed ‘national,’ the Court is more vigilant in striking 
down what would amount to state incursions into subjects that 
Congress may have validly reserved to itself.”
173
 Foreign policy and 
immigration policy are among those national subjects, as the Court 
emphasized.
174
 And perhaps Kurns offers supporting evidence for 
Professor Young’s view that whether or not the Court finds 
preemption, “when the Justices think that the preemption question is 
not a close one, they often choose not to invoke Rice’s tiebreaker 
rule.”
175
 Fourth, perhaps stare decisis exerts more influence in 
preemption cases than in other contexts. Fifth, the “generally 
deregulatory” effect of federal preemption
176
 may have rendered 
preemption more attractive to Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Alito 
when it was businesspeople rather than unauthorized aliens who 
would be deregulated by preemption. Finally, for those dissenters in 
Arizona, the pull of state sovereignty was vastly stronger than in 
Kurns. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
When the results of the battles between state sovereignty and 
federal power in the October Term 2011 of the Supreme Court are 
tallied, and the smoke has cleared, the federal taxing power, the 
 
 172. Id. at 2530 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 173. TRIBE, supra note 97, at 1210. 
 174.  Similarly, on a previous occasion Justice Kennedy had emphasized for a unanimous 
Court in United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000), with respect to the subject of “national 
and international maritime commerce[,]” that “there is no beginning assumption that concurrent 
regulation by the State is a valid exercise of its police powers.”) Id. at 108. 
 175. Young, supra note 116, at 308. 
 176. Id. at 342. 
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preemptive force of the federal immigration power, and at least to a 
significant extent, the federal conditional spending power have 
withstood state sovereignty assaults. On the other hand, the federal 
commerce power, the necessary and proper power, the federal 
spending power (to a certain but probably limited extent), and the 
Section 5 enforcement power suffered meaningful losses. The tilt is 
clear, and the strength of the state sovereignty forces remains 
undiminished, as it has since Justice Thomas replaced Justice 
Marshall. 
It is true and of interest that noticeable and important differences 
in how far the federal power containment campaign should go 
emerged within the governing state sovereignty majority, most 
dramatically with the decision of Chief Justice Roberts in NFIB to 
pull back and uphold nearly all of the ACA, and to a significant 
extent with the immigration preemption rulings supported by the 
Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy in the Arizona decision. Justice 
Scalia’s unyielding state sovereignty positions in NFIB, Coleman, 
and Arizona seem to represent the most aggressive—and in the latter 
two cases, the most singular—attacks on federal power, although 
Justice Thomas remains willing to go further in one respect and 
reconsider the long-established power of Congress to regulate 
commerce among the States based on the substantial cumulative 
effect of local activity, while he continues for the time being to 
adhere to the “congruence and proportionality” approach to 
Congress’s power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Chief Justice Roberts appears at the moment to be the most 
deferential toward federal power of the governing state sovereignty 
majority, whether for reasons of institutional strategy, stare decisis, 
or (more likely in my view) his genuine belief that federal authority 
has more compelling claims to recognition in some respects than his 
state sovereignty brethren hold. Justices Kennedy and Alito continue 
to push more strongly than the Chief Justice would toward limiting 
federal power, though not as much as Justices Scalia and Thomas. 
Still, overall the federal power containment project continues. 
What does this portend for the future? Further curtailment of 
congressional power seems likely. In its 2009 decision in Northwest 
Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder,
177
 the Court 
 
 177.  557 U.S. 193 (2009). 
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offered strong hints that it might determine Congress’s 2006 
reauthorization of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) 
to be an unconstitutional exercise of the congressional power to 
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment’s ban on racial discrimination in 
voting, largely on the basis that Congress, in light of intervening 
changes since 1965, no longer had a sufficient evidentiary record of 
continued disenfranchisement of racial minorities by covered 
jurisdictions before it in 2006 to justify the stringent remedial 
measures prescribed by the VRA’s section 5. Such a decision would 
fit well with the implications of City of Boerne and its most recent 
incarnation in Coleman.
178
 
The line between permitted inducement and forbidden coercion 
resulting from federal spending conditions is likely to be tested 
further, but it is not yet evident that the outcome will amount to a 
significant incursion into Congress’s ability quite effectively to 
influence state behavior through funding policies. More likely to lead 
to significant further restrictions on congressional power are the 
combined majority’s articulations in NFIB of why neither the 
Commerce Clause nor the Necessary and Proper Clause—either 
independently or taken together—could support the ACA’s 
individual mandate. That is not because it seems at all probable that 
Congress will enact further individual mandates. Indeed, the paucity 
of such mandates in the past might be understood to reflect a sense in 
Congress, not so much that they always were constitutionally 
dubious (as the Chief Justice would have it), but that their likely 
unpopularity means that the political check on Congress is more than 
adequate to prevent their adoption except for the most compelling of 
reasons. Nonetheless, if—especially after the NFIB decision—that 
particular form of regulation is not likely to recur, the broader 
structural state sovereignty underpinnings of the majority’s approach 
to the commerce and necessary and proper powers of Congress seem 
likely to be invoked in other limiting forms. In what contexts, in 
what forms, and to what degree remain uncertain, but the ongoing 
 
 178. The Court recently granted certiorari in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, No. 12–96, 
2012 WL 3018430, at *1 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012), “limited to the following question: Whether 
Congress’ decision in 2006 to reauthorize Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act under the pre-
existing coverage formula of Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act exceeded its authority under 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and thus violated the Tenth Amendment and Article 
IV of the United States Constitution.” 
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drive to contain the power of Congress in the name of replenishing 
the forces of state sovereignty seems embedded for now. 
 
